Globalisation, Governmentality and Socio-Economic Development: Reflections from Tanzania

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In today’s world, it is most likely to hear a responsible politician, development worker, intellectual or economist speaking without mentioning globalisation. Hence, the concept of globalisation has over the past three decades grown to become one of the most recognized, widely defined and disputed phenomena in recent history. In this context, this paper examines the role of the state in socio-economic development endeavours in Tanzania in the contemporary globalisation milieu. Foucault’s notion of ‘Governmentality’ is applied in this paper to elucidate the changing nature and rationalities of the state in coping with the intensification of globalisation. The fundamental argument of this paper is that, while it is important to understand how changes in global arena have contributed significantly in changing roles of the state especially in developing nations, scholars and practitioners should as well see how globalization plays double roles in changing roles of the state. That is, while strong states may gain from it, the weak ones lose from the same. In conclusion, it is argued in this paper that by emulating this approach towards analysing the roles of the state in a globalized world, comparative scholars will become more inclusive and encompassing by representing the real world and give equal value of globalization to both developed (strong) and developing (weak) nations.

Keywords: globalisation, socio-economic development, governmentality, Tanzania, Africa

Introduction

It is very hard nowadays to hear a responsible politician, development worker, intellectual or economist speaking without mentioning globalisation. Today, the word seems to be a tag of all political, economic and cultural fields. The concept of globalisation has over the past three decades grown to become one of the most recognized, widely defined and disputed phenomena’s in recent history. Exclusive economic conceptualisations view globalisation as a technological revolution in the process of global production which has changed production systems and global financial flows creating the so-called “global village”. Such developments reverse the orthodox nation-state supposition that it has absolute control over its territory and population, and a fortified role in the running of the economy (Kiely, 2005). Sociological inclined scholars like Shaw (1998) adds to the economic prescriptions of globalisation socio-cultural aspects, the homogenisation of cultures, and the westernisation of global flavour. On the other hand, political economic analysts like Nabudere (2000) define globalisation as the march of capital all over the world in search of consumers and markets. Nabudere’s postulate suggests that globalisation is a process of opening up the world market to the economically advanced states and mega multinational corporations which possess capital and political power. This line of argument suggests that the essence of globalisation roots back to the industrial revolution and primitive accumulation era which were characterised by the march of rich countries capital all over the world in search of consumers and markets. At the material time least developed countries of which include Africa were not able to march capital in Europe due to limited resources, technology, entrepreneurial skills and power to compete with the developed world.

The conceptualisations in the foregone paragraph imply that globalisation is a process driven by incompatible tendencies. On one hand, it unleashes worldwide, productive forces that expand markets; inserts technology in production processes that improves productive capacities and enhances profits for economically powerful states and multinational corporations. On the other, it fragments, differentiate, and marginalise social forces and countries incapable of catching up with its processes.

Generally, the distinct Africa’s historical integration into the global economy through imperialistic processes makes globalisation an intense burden to the continent. The general argument notwithstanding, globalisation has promoted pockets of economic growth and dynamism in some of the
African countries, thus escalating the uneven development inherited from the early forms of global accumulation processes within Africa. In this way, contemporary globalisation has also engendered much competition between and within the countries of Africa. Thus, states in Africa have ever more come under stress to confront the divisive rules of the current globalisation process. The divisions of globalisation are between those countries and regions that can adapt to the new globalising agenda, and those that are either unwilling or incapable of adjusting.

From the discussion above it suffice to say that, for African states to survive the challenges of globalisation and reap its benefits requires effective social economic governance institutions and institutional mechanisms, systems, processes and instruments. This article attempts a historical examination of the role of the state in socio-economic development in Africa in the contemporary globalisation era. Specific attention is placed on the Tanzanian post-colonial era. The article applies Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ to explain the changing nature and rationalities of the state to cope with the intensification of globalisation and its associated challenges to weak countries like Tanzania.

**Globalisation and the Socio-Economic Roles of the State**

With the intensification of globalisation, there has been a discussion whether the state is losing its power on socio economic development. Some scholars such as Hirst and Thompson (1996) propose that certain traditional powers of the state are declining (see also Weiss, 1998). According to Weiss (1998), the power of nation states as administrative and policy making agencies has declined while the state’s role as an economic engineer is lessening. Similarly, Held argues that we are in a new ‘global middle age’, a period reflecting that while the nation states still have vitality, they cannot control their borders and therefore are subject to all sorts of internal and external pressures.

According to Held, the intensification of globalisation has diminished the powers of states, thus “national states have largely become decision takers” instead of decision makers. Arguing along the same line, Habermas (1999) expresses the view that states can no longer count on their own forces to provide its citizens with adequate protection from the external effects of decisions taken by other actors. On the other hand, Castells (1998) argues that many people confuse a loss of sovereignty with a loss of power, as opposed to its changed forms. He is thus proposing that, while global capitalism thrives, and nationalist ideologies explode all over the world, the nation-state seems to lose its power, not its influence. However true this argument is, the central question posed in this article is; which state is losing power? Can we compare a state like Unites States of America and Zambia and argue that state is losing power in capitate to globalisation? It might be true that a state like Zambia is losing power, but is United States of America or United Kingdome losing power in capitate to globalisation or rather gaining more power at the expense of “weak” nations?

Weiss (1998) actually rejects Hirst and Thompson’s idea by arguing that many globalists have not only overstated the degree of state powerlessness but also overgeneralised it. Her argument is that the nation state will matter more rather than less and according to her this situation will advance rather than retard development of the world economy.

Weiss’s argument conforms to a broad-based discussion that the role of the state has to be redefined to take into account the emerging political, economic, social and cultural challenges of globalisation. She discusses four hypotheses of globalisation: (i) Strong globalisation; state power erosion. (ii) Strong globalisation; state power unchanged. (iii) Weak globalization (strong internationalisation); state power reduced in scope. (iv) Weak globalisation (strong internalisation); state power adaptability and differentiation emphasised. Weiss rejects the first and second proposition in favour of the ‘weak globalisation’ idea. She is thus proposing in a fourth hypothesis that “the differential capacities of states and how the world economy, far eliminating such differences, is more likely to sharpen and also emphasize their salience for national prosperity.”

The whole debate about “Globalisation and State” highlighted above seems to suggest to us that the state is not losing power, rather changing or revising its roles. At the same time we note that a revised role for the state does not necessarily imply a ‘greater’ role, but rather a more ‘effective’ role of the state for a more sustainable socio-economic development. For instance, Weiss argues against the earlier work of Hirst and Thompson (1996) on the devolving power of the state. She argues that the state is not so much devolving power, rather seeking power sharing arrangements which give it scope for remaining an active centre, hence being a ‘catalytic’ state.

However, Hirst and Thompson (1996) argue later that in another volume that, despite the intensification of globalisation, national government remains a crucial element in the economic success of their societies through provision of cohesion, solidarity and certain crucial services that markets cannot. They discussed three interrelated key functions of states: (i) In order for the state to influence the economy, must construct a distributional coalition to win the acceptance of key
economic actors and the organised social interests representing these actors. (ii) For the distributional coalition to work, the state must orchestrate social consensus among the actors for the common national economic goals. (iii) The state must also achieve an adequate balance between different levels of government in the distribution of its fiscal resources and regulatory activities.

The Socio-Economic Development in Africa: Historical Overview

The 1960s was an independence decade for most of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Since then, most of these countries have experienced various forms of political governance regimes, ranging from extreme totalitarian states to the liberal democratic tradition (OECD, 2004, p.36).

Most of the countries in SSA practiced a distinctive political behaviour and created regional institutions designed to protect their newly born states from any external interference. African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana; Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo in Nigeria; Jomo Kenyatta, Thomas Mboya and Jaramogi Odinga in Kenya; Amilcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau; and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania produced development philosophies which justified their conceptions of where they would want to focus after independence. To them, the major challenge was how to extend traditional African values to the modern nation-state setting. In meeting this challenge, most of these leaders aspirated to use the best from their own traditions of governance to oversee social development within their countries. By some measures, this was successful. For instance, Todd Moss has noted that Africa’s immediate post-independence period was fairly positive, with income per capita rising about 2.4 per cent per year during the 1960s (2007, p. 89).

Tanzanian Post-Colonial Socio-Economic Philosophy

In Tanzania, President Julius Nyerere postulated Ujamaa — his particular version of socialism—as the answer to the Tanzania’s political and socio-economic problems. Nyerere was known not only as an articulate spokesman for African liberation and African unity, but also as an educator and philosopher (Kassam, 1983, p. 56). Before beginning his political career, Nyerere was a teacher, and as a result of the intimate interaction between his political and educational leadership, he was tenderly and respectfully referred to by the title of Mwalimu, or teacher, by Tanzanians. Soon after independence in 1961, the government declared three “enemies” that threatened independence and national security: poverty, ignorance, and disease (Nyerere, 1966, p. 115). On the evening of the day he took his oaths as Prime Minister of Tanganyika in May 1961, Nyerere told Tanganyikans: “I have talked to you before about poverty, ignorance, and disease. But in fact, if we defeat poverty, we shall have achieved the means by which we can defeat ignorance and disease. Yet poverty is something that really only you can fight. . . . This is your battle. This is our battle. This is the enemy we all must fight (Nyerere, 1966, pp.114-115).”

In an effort to eradicate these three enemies, Nyerere pursued social, political and economic policies that redefined the roles and functions of the state. In February 1967, President Nyerere’s government adopted a socialist development economy that led to extensive government involvement in all social spheres in addition to centralized public planning and control and delivery of social services. The government of Tanzania attempted to implement a nationwide system of collectivized agriculture, with emphasis on the canon of socialism and self-reliance. These two guiding principles were channelled through the ruling party under the rubric of the Arusha Declaration.

The Arusha Declaration is a set of principles drafted in Arusha Town by the governing party, TANU, in February 1967, to serve as a guide toward economic and social development in Tanzania. The essential substance of the Arusha Declaration was a rejection of the concept of national splendor as distinct from the well-being of its citizens, and a rejection of material wealth for its own sake. The declaration emphasized the concept of equal opportunity and the need to reduce social inequities. As stated by President Nyerere: “The objective of socialism in Tanzania is to build a society in which all members have equal rights and equal opportunities; in which all can live in peace with their neighbors without suffering or imposing injustice, being exploited, or exploiting; and in which all have a gradually increasing basic level of material welfare before any individual lives in luxury (Nyerere, 196, p. 340).”

The Arusha Declaration was a commitment to the belief that there are more important things in life than amassing riches, and that, if the pursuit of wealth clashes with concerns such as human dignity and social equality, then the latter are to be given priority (Nyerere, 1968, p. 316). The Arusha Declaration emphasizes the need for mobilizing human resources for self-reliant development rather than relying on capital or material resources, underpinned by the idea that the development of a country is brought about by people, not by money. According to Nyerere, money and the wealth it represents should be the result and not the basis for Tanzania’s development (Nyerere, 1968, p. 243). Hence, the Arusha Declaration identifies
four prerequisites for Tanzania's development: (i) land, (ii) people, (iii) good policies, and (iv) good leadership. The Arusha Declaration states the principle that land is the basis for human life and all Tanzanians should treat it as a valuable investment for future development. Thus, it is a responsibility of the government to see to it that land is used for the benefit of the whole nation and not for the benefit of one individual or just a few people. The Arusha Declaration also states the belief that people are important tools for policy implementation. Hence, the people of Tanzania had to be taught the meaning of self-reliance and how to practice it. The Arusha Declaration states that socialism and self-reliance are the best policies for the development of a young nation like Tanzania. Finally, the Arusha Declaration recognizes the importance of good leadership and the urgency of establishing such: leaders must set a good example to the rest of the people in their lives and in all their activities (see Nyerere, 1967). President Nyerere’s goal was to make his poor nation economically and politically independent and to create an equalitarian society.

According to Yefru, the Declaration was widely acknowledged by many African countries for its historical significance in development (2000, p. 366). Yefru notes further that the significance of the Arusha Declaration lies on its idea of development from the grass roots, which no one country in the continent envisioned the same.

In September 1967, Nyerere published his book, Socialism and Rural Development, in which he spelled out three governing principles upheld by socialism and self-reliance: equality, mutual respect for all families, and participation in the collective development. President Nyerere emphasized rural development because about 90 per cent of all Tanzanians lived in rural areas and the majority of them relied on a subsistence agricultural economy. Through his rural development strategy, all Tanzanians were encouraged to form villages based on co-operation and communal work, commonly known as Ujamaa villages. Essentially, this implied two things: village autonomy and a directed effort by the state (Hyden, 1980, p. 105).

This development strategy advocated that development beneficiaries actively contribute to their own development whereas the government would provide social services such as roads, schools and hospitals. However, as with many other social experiments of this kind, Nyerere’s ambitions failed to meet the objective of eradicating poverty, ignorance, and disease, and Tanzania’s economy was ultimately crippled by a combination of Ujamaa’s policies, natural disasters and a war with Uganda in the late 1970s.

Globalisation and Changing Roles and Rationalities of the State

Following the wide array of global reforms pioneered by the World Bank and the IMF in the early 1980s, the failure of Tanzanian socialism was accepted as obvious especially for Nyerere and his ruling party – Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM, Revolutionary Party). By 1985, the government was essentially bankrupt and had little choice but to comply with the World Bank and the IMF (Holtem, 2005, p. 550). While Nyerere admitted that some of his policies were mistakes (for instance, nationalization of the sisal plantations), he nevertheless defended the validity of his policies until his death in October 1999. In his very last interview, with the New Internationalist Magazine (NIM) about a year before he died, Nyerere was asked, “Does the Arusha Declaration still stand up today?” He responded: “I still travel around with it. I read it over and over to see what I would change. Maybe I would improve on the Kiswahili that was used but the Declaration is still valid. I would not change a thing. Tanzania had been independent for a short time before we began to see a growing gap between the haves and the have-nots in our country. A privileged group was emerging from the political leaders and bureaucrats who had been poor under colonial rule but were now beginning to use their positions in the Party and the Government to enrich themselves. This kind of development would alienate the leadership from the people. So we articulated a new national objective: we stressed that development is about all our people and not just a small and privileged minority. The Arusha Declaration was what made Tanzania distinctly Tanzania. We stated what we stood for, we laid down a code of conduct for our leaders and we made an effort to achieve our goals. This was obvious to all, even if we made mistakes—and when one tries anything new and uncharted there are bound to be mistakes . . . I still think that in the end Tanzania will return to the values and basic principles of the Arusha Declaration (NIM, 1999).”

In 1985, Julius Nyerere voluntarily retired from the presidency, although he remained the chair of the ruling party, CCM, until August 1990. Nyerere’s successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, launched the first Economic Recovery Plan (ERP) in 1986, a liberalization program which emphasized the production of cash crops through individual incentive, free market incentives in industrial production, and devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling (Zirker, 1997). Since 1986, Tanzania gradually began the transition to a more market-based or capitalist economy.

Although the impact of globalisation is a debatable matter, it is commonly believed that the African continent is being negatively affected and thus
not benefiting from this phenomenon (Njoh, 2006). While others see globalization from inside out, other lens provides peripheral vision which sees globalization from the outside in. Some African leaders such as Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe view globalisation as a form of oppression in which Africa needs to resist by all means necessary (see Njoh, 2006). On the other hand, Former Tanzanian President, Benjamin Mkapa argues that globalisation is inevitable and reactions to its challenges have to steadily begin at home. Thus, Tanzanian government akin other African states have been curious in finding different ways where they can embark on the inevitable challenges of globalization so as to ensure the optimal realization of people’s interest as well as acquiring tribute from the international community. These include inter alia changing forms of governmentality to muddle through the contemporary global socio-economic changes.

French philosopher, Michel Foucault uses the term ‘governmentality’ as a ‘guideline’ for the analysis he offers by way of historical reconstructions embracing a period starting from Ancient Greek through to modern Neo-liberalism. Foucault saw a changing nature of the state as being a function of changing rationalities of government, where governmentality can be considered as the art of government, that is, a way of thinking about the nature of the practice of government. This address questions such as who can govern? What governing is? What or who is governed? (Gordon 1991, quoted by Tikly). Governmentality also has a more specific meaning as a way of marking the emergence of a distinctly new form of thinking about the exercising of power in certain societies for a more sustainable development. As discussed by Gunn (2006), Governmentality encompasses the ‘conduct of conduct’, the art and rationality of all forms of governance. He is further arguing that, “How to manage a population and to maintain its wealth and security becomes an essential part of the art of government and its rationality”.

In his paper Governmentality and the Study of Education Policy in South Africa, Tikly draws on other scholars’ (e.g. Rose and Miller 1992, Harris 1999) ideas to relate governmentality and education policy. According to him, these authors made a helpful distinction between political rationalities (ways of thinking about the dimensions and practices of government); programmes of government (which use theories and particular way of thinking about and doing things to translate political rationalities into actual measures that affect populations); and technologies of government (the techniques, procedures and strategies that are used to put political rationalities and programmes into effects). However Lemke (2000) argues that, Foucault’s main problem is not to investigate if practices conform to rationalities, but to discover which kind of rationality they are using. Foucault intended “…to examine how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what role they play within them, because it’s true that ‘practices’ don’t exist without a certain regime of rationality” (Foucault 1991, p. 79 cited by Lemke, 2000). Hence, from early 1990s, Tanzanian government deepened and extended the use of a neo-liberal rationality of governance in order to respond to the 1970’s and 1980’s economic crisis. Prior to that, several commissions were appointed to look into some of the critical areas of the public sector and recommended ways of revitalizing them.

In early 1983, a commission headed by Peter Kisumo was instructed to review the role and structure of government organs and to suggest changes that would help in expenditure reduction, revenue enhancement, and performance improvement. Most of the commission’s recommendations focused on cost cutting and efficiency improvements. In 1985, another commission chaired by Amon Nsekela was asked to look into the organizational structure of the civil service, salary structure and remunerative aspects. Correspondingly, in 1989, a Presidential Commission of Enquiry, headed by a former governor of the Central Bank, Edwin Mtei, looked into public revenue, taxation and expenditure. All these commissions demonstrated an attempt to fine-tune the functioning of government within the context of stringent resource difficulties. However, all these commissions failed to bring major changes in the administrative machinery and socio-economic performance.

Since the government’s main socio-economic policy objective was to bring the economy on a balanced and sustained growth, Tanzania, akin other African countries, started negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) leading to the adoption of a series of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) and Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP) in the mid 1980s. These programmes aimed at promoting economic growth, reducing poverty and encouraging popular participation and good governance. Two economic recovery programmes (ERP I: 1986/87 – 1988/89 and ERP II: 1989/90 – 1991/92) aimed at raising GDP growth to an average of 5 per cent, reducing inflation to below 10 per cent, restoring internal and external balances in the economy and improving social delivery. The most current thinking in the government circles in relation to reforming the economy was first reflected in the first three-year Rolling Plan and Forward Budget (RPFB) for 1993/94 -1995/96. The Rolling Plan addresses institutional reforms as being the corner stone of its setting for the relevant post-ERP II. In 2000, Tanzanian government also decided to
introduce the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), focusing on democrtisation, decentralization, liberalization, responsiveness and social equity as a basis for the sustainable good governance especially at the local level. One major objective of the LGRP in Tanzania was to transfer power, functions and decision making to the lower levels of governance by adhering to the principle of subsidiarity\(^2\). (URT, 2002, p. 6) The decentralized powers and functions are not only intended to be centralized at district level but further carried down to wards, villages, vitongoji (hamlets), mitaa (streets), and to the outlet level.

The objectives of reform in Tanzania include: to reduce the size of government to affordable levels; to improve the performance of civil servants; to reduce the number of civil servants in the government; to develop open, objective and competitive pay structure; and to support the decentralization of government functions by rationalizing central and local government linkages. The program is driven by a vision of creating a civil service anchored in professional and managerial culture, which cherishes promoting efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of government services (Kiragu, 1998).

Furthermore, reform program in Tanzania aims at putting the “public” or the citizenry at the focus of every function and activity of the public service. Thus apart from being performance-oriented, the reform process aims at raising the levels of public service delivery; reinstating ethical conduct and values of public servants; and developing leadership, management and technical skills of public servants. In a nutshell, the entire process comprises of the following components: performance management; restructuring and private sector participation; executive agencies program; management information systems; leadership, management development and governance; and, lastly, program coordination, monitoring and evaluation.

**Socio-Economic Development and State-Civil Society Interplay in Tanzania**

The whole idea of reform in Tanzania embraces a neo-liberal paradigm of “New Public Management”. Rhodes argued that New Public Management (NPM) has two meanings: managerialism and new institutional economics (1997, p. 48). Managerialism refers to introducing private sector management methods to the public sector. It stresses hands-on professional management, explicit standards and measures of performance, managing by results and value for money and also closeness to the customer. The New Institutional Economics on the other hand refers to introducing incentive structures (such as market competition) into public service provision. It stresses disaggregating bureaucracies, greater competition through contracting out and quasi-markets, and customer choice. Generally, NPM is used to describe a management culture that emphasizes the centrality of the citizen or customer, as well as accountability for results. It is associated with pursuit of a minimalist role for the state, while opening more opportunities for civil society’s involvement in socio-economic development.

The notion of ‘civil society’ has become the subject of debate from the mid 1970s. As Gibbon discusses, civil society made its re-entry into 20th century political theory through the strategic thoughts of Polish intellectuals on promoting liberal democratization under state society. Gibbon quotes De Tocqueville’s definition of civil society– “…a plurality of organized interest groups playing an organically conservative role by serving as a two-way barrier-protecting the state from spontaneous ‘mass’ impulses, as well as shielding those with a significant stake in society from possible interventions by the state”. Siri Lange et al (2000) quote Tvedten’s definition who explains civil society as “the public realm of organised social activity located between the state and the private household”. Civil society does not simply include political and ideological pluralities such as political parties, religious and cultural organizations, but all pluralities through which individual and collective material existence is organized (Gibbon 2001).

While civil societies in Tanzania were discouraged between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s, the process of economic and political liberalization which Tanzania embarked from the mid 1980s signified a huge transformation for the non-state sector, which has since then multiplied. The government Tanzania redefined the role of the state to that of policy maker, maintenance of law and order, provider of basic social and economic infrastructure and facilitator of economic growth. The government facilitates the private sector and other economic agents to actively and effectively invest in productive and commercial activities in order to accelerate socio-economic growth and development. With that in mind, the government puts favourable policies and enabling environment for local and foreign investment as well as promotion of institutional changes conducive to the development of the private sector. Tanzanian government also stimulates investor’s confidence through transparent, effective and efficient administrative processes and appropriate legal and regulatory framework. As Gibbon explores, from the late 1990s, the role and importance of civil society in social services provision in Tanzania is highly consolidated. Significant changes in the roles that these institutions played in socio-economic development
could be noted. According to Gibbon, these civil societies were based around income-generating activities and social service provision, of which members themselves were the main beneficiaries. For instance, in 1993, there were 224 registered NGOs whereas seven years after (2000) the number rose to 8499. Civil society provides a ground for people to engage themselves in activities they perceive as important to them. It further provides a room for discussion of critical issues that are of concern to people, thus linking them together and creating shared values. As Lange et al (2000) noted in their report, many scholars have emphasized that a strong civil society contributes to processes that are fundamental important to the socio-economic development of a country. In Tanzania, despite the fast growing of civil society, it is still characterized as weak by the international organizations working in the country.

Conclusion

As a whole, this study offers an important lesson on the role of the state in socio-economic development endeavours in Tanzania and other developing nations in the contemporary globalisation milieu. As argued by Karns and Mingst (2004), globalisation is linking issues and actors together in complex new ways, where economic, humanitarian, health and environmental problems respect no state boundaries. Thus, small events in one place can have catalytic effects, so that consequences later and elsewhere are vast (Keohane and Nye quoted by Karns & Mingst, 2004). As Ilesanmi (2004) explains, globalisation is likely to remain a permanent feature of our present and future existence, and there may be good reasons to celebrate it. As argued in this paper, it is important to understand how changes in global arena have contributed significantly in changing roles of the state especially in developing nations. In view of this paper, it is important to see how globalization plays double roles in changing rules of the state. That is, while strong states may gain from it, the weak ones lose from the same. By emulating this study, comparative scholars will become more inclusive and encompassing by representing the real world and give equal value of globalization to both developed (strong) and developing (weak) nations.

Notes

2. This is a fundamental principle to the local government reform in Tanzania. It is a type of reasoning about the distribution of authority and resources, which all other principles of authority will have to adjust to.

References